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"Mr. President,... [h]ave you ever been present at a meeting of the New
York legislature? They speak very fast and very loud and nobody listens to
anybody else, with the result that nothing ever gets done."
Robert Morris'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2011, after several weeks of tense negotiations between
Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo and Republican State Senate
leadership, New York enacted the Marriage Equality Act, thus becoming
1. PETER STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS, 1776: A MUSICAL PLAY 56 (Penguin
Books 1976) (1970) (explaining to John Hancock why the New York delegation to the
Continental Congress never receives instructions).
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the sixth state to allow same-sex marriage, and the first with a Republican-
controlled legislative branch to enact such a law.2 The days between
passage in the Assembly and final passage in the Senate were filled with
protests by opponents of same-sex marriage and support rallies from
proponents.3 Doubt about whether the Senate would even vote on the
measure reigned until the last day of the legislative session. The
breakthrough came via an agreement on a set of amendments that purported
to strengthen exemptions for religious practitioners and religiously-
affiliated organizations.5 To help protect the political bargain from judicial
revision, the amendment bill also included an inseverability clause, raising
consternation amongst marriage equality supporters.6
An abundance of literature analyzes many actual and potential issues
arising from concerns of people whose sincerely-held religious beliefs
militate against laws ensuring freedom from discrimination for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) individuals.7 Some
commentators have expressed concern that, specific to same-sex marriage,
antidiscrimination laws will be used to suppress the religious freedoms of
8
those whose religious teachings do not recognize same-sex marriage.
Some have proposed broadly exempting religiously-affiliated groups,
places of public accommodation, and public officials from participation in,
2. See Mary Snow, New York Moves to Become 6th State to Legalize Gay
Marriage, CNN (June 24, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-24/politics/
new.york.gay.marriage 1 couples-equal-rights-marriage-equality-gay-marriage
(reviewing the process from Assembly passage through amendment and Senate
passage).
3. See Danny Hakim, Senate Republicans Ponder Marriage Vote as Clock Ticks,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at At7 (describing the competing rallies inside and outside
the Senate halls as negotiations were ongoing).
4. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, N.Y. Gay Marriage Bill Gains
Key Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/
nyregion/new-york-state-senate-to-vote-on-same-sex-marriage.html (noting that the
vote was the last of the legislative session).
5. See id. (reviewing the religious exemptions agreed to by political leaders).
6. See, e.g., Maurice Lacunza, New York Marriage Equality Has Achilles Heel
That Could Void the Entire Law, CHANGING THE PLANET (June 25, 2011, 2:21 PM),
http://www.changingtheplanet.com/2011/06/new-york-marriage-equality-has-
achilles.html (emphasizing that future same-sex marriages would be barred if a court
enforced the clause, which requires that the entire statute be stricken if any provision is
unconstitutional).
7. See, e.g., Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic
Charities of Boston was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious
Freedom, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 297, 297-300 (2008) (reviewing the conflict
over Catholic Charities' adoption services in Massachusetts after enactment of a state
law barring discrimination based on sexual orientation).
8. See generally THOMAS M. MESSNER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND THE THREAT TO RELIGIoUS LIBERTY (2008), available at
http://wwwv.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg2201.cfm (arguing that same-sex marriage
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and in some cases recognition of, same-sex marriages.9 In the run-up to the
legislative debate over the Marriage Equality Act, a group of legal scholars
proposed such draft language, but these recommendations were not
adopted. 10
This Comment argues that the religious exemptions in the Marriage
Equality Act create little change to existing New York law, and that courts
should avoid creating new interpretations. Part II reviews existing New
York antidiscrimination and marriage law, discusses the Marriage Equality
Act, notes New York's rules on statutory interpretation, and introduces
scenarios that might reach New York courts requiring interpretation of the
new exemptions." Part III analyzes three questions the New York courts
are likely to encounter: (1) whether the new religious exemption language
changes the interpretation of existing antidiscrimination law, (2) whether
the inseverability clause will work to enforce the political bargain that led
to passage of the Marriage Equality Act, and (3) whether failure to exempt
public employees creates new burdens under existing marriage and
antidiscrimination law. 12 Part IV offers policy arguments opposing
attaching broad religious exemptions to same-sex marriage laws. 3 Finally,
Part V concludes that the amendments to the Marriage Equality Act, while
politically necessary, will have little legal impact.14
9. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for
Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc.
POL'Y 318, 323-31 (2010) (arguing that public employees with sincerely-held religious
beliefs should be exempt from facilitating same-sex marriages).
10. See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Senator Dean G. Skelos, New
York State Senate (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter Skelos Letter], available at
http://www.nysun.com/files/lawprofessorsletter.pdf (proposing broad religious
exemption language to the leader of the New York State Senate).
11. See infra Part II (reviewing New York antidiscrimination laws, marriage laws,
and rules of statutory interpretation, as well as introducing a relevant New Jersey case
and an emerging New York conflict).
12. See infra Part III (analyzing the impact of the new religious exemption
language in light of existing statutes and case law, explaining how New York courts
should interpret the inseverability clause, and exploring the impact on public
employees from enacting same-sex marriage).
13. See infra Part IV (arguing that exemptions proposed by some commentators are
unconstitutionally broad and that New York's existing model of antidiscrimination law
and religious protections is the proper model for other states to adopt).
14. See infra Part V (concluding that the amendments add little to existing
protections and result in minimal new legal impact).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. New York Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Law
1. Overview and Applicable Provisions
New York's Human Rights Law covers most issues related to claims of
unlawful discrimination and provides an administrative complaint process,
via the Division of Human Rights (DHR), with provisions for judicial
review.15  In 2002, New York enacted the Sexual Orientation Non-
Discrimination Act (SONDA), adding sexual orientation as a protected
class in the Human Rights Law, Civil Rights Law, and Education Law.16
SONDA expressly disavowed any change to existing marriage laws,
thereby postponing the debate over same-sex marriage.1
Under the Human Rights Law, "place of public accommodation, resort
or amusement" is defined in broad terms intended to be construed liberally,
largely barring discrimination in such places.18 Places and organizations
found to be "distinctly private" are exempted.19 Corporations formed under
New York's Benevolent OrdersLaw or Religious Corporations Law are
classified as "distinctly private," but other groups have the burden of
proving their private nature to the DHR.20 The Human Rights Law also
exempts religious and affiliated organizations from many of the law's
provisions, such as those related to employment and rental of housing.2 1
Additionally, employers are required to provide reasonable accommodation
15. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (enumerating unlawful
discriminatory practices and protected classes); id §§ 297-98 (reviewing the
administrative and judicial processes for discrimination complaints).
16. See generally Act of Dec. 17, 2002, ch. 2, 2002 N.Y. Laws 46 (adding sexual
orientation to existing antidiscrimination laws).
17. See id. § 1 (requiring interpretation of SONDA to not alter any constitutional or
statutory provision relating to marriage).
18. See EXEC. § 292(9) (specifying "all places included in the meaning of such
terms" with a long list of terms); id. § 296(2) (enumerating many protected classes, and
defining discrimination as an unlawful discriminatory practice); cf Cahill v. Rosa, 674
N.E.2d 274, 277-78 (N.Y. 1996) (construing the statute broadly in affirming that a
dental office discriminated based on disability for refusing to treat a patient with HIV).
19. See EXEC. § 292(9) (defining "distinctly private" by exceptions such as
excluding places that routinely rent to non-members).
20. See id. (classifying religious corporations and benevolent orders as "distinctly
private" as an exception to the requirement that an organization prove its private
nature); Gifford v. Guilderland Lodge, No. 2480, B.P.O.E., 707 N.Y.S.2d 722, 722
(App. Div. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of a discrimination complaint against a club
incorporated as a benevolent order because such organizations are deemed "distinctly
private").
21. See EXEC. § 296(11) (allowing religious and affiliated organizations to take
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for the religious practices of their employees, but the employee must
expressly request such accommodations in advance.22
2. Case Law Interpreting Human Rights Law Provisions
While the religious exemption language in the Human Rights Law is
broad, New York courts balance the State's interest in preventing
discrimination against the religious exercise rights of individuals and
organizations. 2 3 The Supreme Court for New York County noted in Logan
v. Salvation Army that while section 296(11) expressly exempts religiously-
affiliated employers in hiring and promotion decisions, that exemption does
not protect employers from claims of on-the-job harassment.24
In Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division upheld a state law requiring employers
to provide coverage for contraceptives in their group prescription insurance
plans.2 5 The court held that because the law was a neutral law of general
applicability, there was no conflict with the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause.26 Under the New York Constitution, the court applied a
balancing test to hold that the State's interest in ensuring access to
contraception in order to promote public health predominated over the
burden on the religious exercise rights of employers.27 Finally, the court
held the exemptions for religious organizations in the Human Rights Law
28
inapplicable to the insurance coverage statute.
22. See id. § 296(10)(a) (requiring that employers accommodate employees'
"sincerely held practice" of religion unless doing so would cause "undue hardship" to
the employer's business); State Div. of Human Rights v. Rochester Prods. Div. of Gen.
Motors Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that failure to request
an accommodation in advance can be a waiver).
23. See generally Logan v. Salvation Army, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(balancing an employer's interest in religious freedom against the State's interest in
barring discrimination).
24. See id at 848-49 (denying motion to dismiss claims of on-the-job religious
harassment).
25. See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 808 N.Y.S.2d 447,
466 (App. Div.) (finding the requirement in conformance with the federal and state
constitutions and that the exemptions in the Human Rights Law were inapplicable),
aff'd, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
26. See id at 455 (applying the neutral-law test from Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1989)). See generally Kris Banvard, Comment, Exercise in Frustration? A New
Attempt by Congress to Restore Strict Scrutiny to Governmental Burdens on Religious
Practice, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 279, 292-301 (2003) (reviewing attempts to restore a
"compelling interest" test for legislation that burdens religion, as was the case before
Smith).
27. See Serio, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 456-59 (balancing the interest the State is
attempting to enforce with the individual's religious freedom (citing People v.
Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, 236 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y.
1968) (mem.))).
28. See id. at 465-66 (noting that there is no suggestion in the language of the
Human Rights Law that the exemption applies to other laws the legislature might pass).
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The requirement that employers reasonably accommodate the religious
beliefs of their employees applies to public and private employers.2 9 The
New York Court of Appeals in New York City Transit Authority v. State
Division of Human Rights found that the Transit Authority had not made
reasonable accommodations for the employee's religious exercise,
upholding the administrative finding of the DHR.30 The court noted that no
one should be forced to choose between their religion and their job, unless
accommodations are simply infeasible.31
Courts avoid inquiry into the validity of a claim of sincerely held
religious belief.3 2 In Faur v. Jewish Theological Seminary ofAmerica, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division upheld the dismissal of a
religious discrimination complaint, citing entanglement concerns.33 Courts
will address cases involving religious organizations when the issues can be
addressed on neutral principles of law.34
B. New York Marriage Law
Under New York's Domestic Relations Law, couples seeking to marry in
New York must first obtain a marriage license from a town or city clerk,
and their marriage can be solemnized either by an officiant authorized by
statute, or by filing a witnessed contract with the court. A municipal
clerk has a duty to issue a marriage license to qualified applicants, and is
empowered only to inquire about the applicants' age and eligibility.36 Prior
29. See generally N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 674 N.E.2d
305 (N.Y. 1996) (finding discrimination in failure to accommodate shift swaps for an
employee's Sabbath).
30. See id. at 310 (affirming the DHR's ruling that the employer failed to make
reasonable attempts to address the employee's needs).
31. See id. (explaining that the statute is an expression of public policy favoring
protecting religious diversity and barring invidious discrimination on the basis of
religion).
32. See, e.g., Faur v. Jewish Theological Seminary of Am., 536 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517
(A pp. Div. 1989) (noting that courts violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments if
called on to make a religious determination).
33. See id (finding that the court could not examine whether the seminary's change
in policy constituted religious discrimination without impermissibly interfering in
religious matters, referred to as "entanglement").
34. See, e.g., Vione v. Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (finding that
the court could address breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against plaintiffs pastor as these claims do not involve religious
doctrine).
35. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 13-15 (McKinney 2010) (requiring that couples
obtain a license and return it after solemnization); id. § 11-12 (enumerating clerical
and civil officers who may solemnize a marriage, and requiring witnesses to
solemnization).
36. See Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861-62 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (noting
that a city clerk has no discretion in issuing marriage licenses, but denying complaint of
same-sex couples, finding that they were not valid applicants), aff'd, 811 N.Y.S.2d 134
(App. Div.), aff'd sum nom. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006).
2012] 967
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to implementation of the license requirement in 1933, New York
recognized common-law marriages, and common-law marriages entered
into before the new law went into effect remained valid.37 Finally, prior to
enactment of the Marriage Equality Act, New York recognized out-of-state
same-sex marriages in some situations, but courts held that the Domestic
Relations Law barred in-state same-sex marriages.
The Marriage Equality Act amends the Domestic Relations Law,
specifying the intent of the legislature that same-sex and opposite-sex
marriages are to be treated identically under the law, and that any omission
of statutory language is not to be construed as intent to preserve any legal
distinction. 39 Two new sections were added: section 10-a, which makes
New York marriages gender-neutral by prohibiting any legal distinctions
based on the gender of parties to a marriage, and section 10-b, which
defines new exemptions for religiously-affiliated organizations and
reinforces existing statutory provisions and constitutional protections.4 0
The requirements for issuing licenses were amended to clarify that the sex
of the parties is not a basis for denial of a license.4 1 The provisions for
solemnizing marriages were amended to clarify that no member of the
clergy is required to solemnize any marriage and that no penalties can flow
from refusing to do so. 42 Finally, an inseverability clause was included to
seal the political bargain, directing that the entire Act be stricken if any part
is found to be invalid.4 3
37. See In re Benjamin's Estate, 311 N.E.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. 1974) (noting that
even though common-law marriages were abolished in 1933, common-law marriages
previously entered are recognized so long as the parties were competent to marry).
38. See, e.g., Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 833 (Sup. Ct. 2008)
(upholding the Governor's executive order that state agencies recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other jurisdictions, based on the absence of express legislation
to the contrary); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (applying
rational basis scrutiny to find no Equal Protection or Due Process violation in the
Domestic Relations Law's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples).
39. See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 2, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney)
(stating that the legislature intends same-sex couples to have the same access to
protections, obligations, and benefits of marriage as opposite-sex couples); see also
infra Appendix I (providing the text of selected provisions of the Marriage Equality
Act).
40. See Marriage Equality Act, sec. 3, § 10-a (defining marriages as valid
regardless of the sex of the parties and requiring that all laws referring to marriage be
construed as gender-neutral); Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, § 10-b, 2011 N.Y.
Sess. Laws 96 (McKinney) (exempting religiously-affiliated organizations from
solemnizing or celebrating marriages and noting that the Marriage Equality Act will not
limit Human Rights Law exemptions or protections in the State Constitution).
41. See Marriage Equality Act, sec. 4, § 13 (clarifying that a marriage license may
not be denied to same-sex applicants).
42. See id., sec. 5, § 11 (specifying that no clergy member can be required to
solemnize a marriage, nor be punished by private action for such refusal); Act of June
24, 2011, sec. 2, § 11 (barring state sanction for refusal to solemnize a marriage).
43. See Act of June 24, 2011 § 3 (providing that the entire Marriage Equality Act is
968
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C. New York Statutory Interpretation
1. Canons ofStatutory Construction and Related Rules ofInterpretation
The New York Code includes a treatise on the enactment and
interpretation of statutes, including rules of statutory interpretation that are
frequently cited in state court decisions." The primary consideration for
courts is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, even above a literal
interpretation of statutory text.4 5 Statutes are also to be interpreted under
equitable principles to avoid hardship or injustice. 46 Courts can refer to
extrinsic aids in interpretation, such as legislative history, but only when
the text of the statute is ambiguous.4 7
Particularly applicable to analysis of the Marriage Equality Act is the
rule that statutes should not be construed in a fashion that strips them of
any effect.48 Thus in New York State Crime Victims Board ex rel. Organek
v. Harris, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division interpreted the
"Son of Sam" statute to grant the crime victim's request for a preliminary
injunction barring the perpetrator's use of the funds held in guardianship,
rejecting the convict's reading that the statute did not provide for
preliminary injunctions.4 9 Additionally, courts apply a strong presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments.50 Courts will typically avoid
constitutional questions whenever another interpretation is available.51 In
to be construed as a whole).
44. See generally N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 71-262 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 2011)
(defining and annotating the rules of "statutory construction" that courts use to construe
and analyze statutes, as well as rules for resolving interpretive conflicts).
45. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 52 (N.Y. 1989) (reviewing the
meaning of "family" in a rent-control statute and explaining that legislative intent in
statutory interpretation is more important than rules of grammar or logic (citing United
States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905))).
46. See id (explaining that avoidance of hardship or injustice is a key consideration
when balancing different interpretations (citing STAT. §§ 141, 143, 146)).
47. See Lloyd v. Grella, 634 N.E.2d 171, 174 (N.Y. 1994) (discussing statutory
interpretation and noting that an unambiguous statute must be construed without
reference to legislative history (citing STAT. § 76)). See generally STAT. §§ 76, 120-30
(reviewing categories of extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and
administrative agency interpretation).
48. See STAT. § 144 (creating a presumption that the legislature did not act with an
intent that their acts have no effect).
49. See N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd. ex rel. Organek v. Harris, 891 N.Y.S.2d 175,
177 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that reading the "Son of Sam" statute as barring a
preliminary injunction would strip it of any effect, since the convict could dispose of
the funds before the victim could recover them).
50. See, e.g., LaValle v. Hayden, 773 N.E.2d 490, 494 (N.Y. 2002) (noting that the
challenging party has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable
doubt).
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In re Jacob, the New York Court of Appeals followed this canon to hold
that a statutory provision requiring termination of a biological parent's
rights when a child is adopted could not be enforced to strip a biological
mother of her parental rights when the biological mother's lesbian partner
adopted their child.52
When local ordinances and state laws overlap, the court must determine
whether or not the local ordinance is preempted by state law.53 State law
preempts inconsistent local ordinances. 54 In Hoetzer v. Erie County, the
district court voided a county drug paraphernalia law as preempted by state
55law, on the basis that state law did not allow for local revision.
2. Severability and Inseverability
Courts cannot always avoid constitutional questions and are thus faced
with deciding whether the entire statute should be declared invalid or
whether the invalid provision should be "severed" when unconstitutionality
is found. In New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Clarkstown, the
district court invalidated an entire statute even though federal law
preempted only some of the provisions. Under New York law, a court
should only sever an invalid provision when the legislature would have
intended such severance, provided that the remaining provisions can still
operate.58  The presence of a severability clause provides a strong
presumption in favor of severance but is not dispositive. 9  When the
52. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that the alternate
interpretation, holding the provision applicable, would raise constitutional questions
regarding the rights of both adoptive children and prospective parents).
53. See generally Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 865 N.Y.S.2d 504,
508-09 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (rejecting the argument that state law preempted county
competitive bidding ordinances).
54. See id. (clarifying that "inconsistent" means not only literally inconsistent
language but also cases where a local ordinance would inhibit operation of state law).
55. See Hoetzer v. Erie Cnty., 497 F. Supp. 1207, 1215-16 (W.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding that the local law was not inconsistent with the state law, but that the state
legislature had intended to occupy the entire field of law, to the exclusion of local
enactments).
56. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993)
(reviewing the evolution of severability jurisprudence and courts' interpretation of
legislative intent when faced with an unconstitutional statutory provision).
57. See N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 603 F. Supp. 2d 715, 734-
35 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying New York rules of statutory interpretation and finding
that the statutory language that remained after the preempted provisions were struck
could not function alone), aff'd, 612 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2010).
58. See id at 734 (analogizing to the difference between trimming branches and
severing the roots of a tree (citing Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.E.2d
202, 207 (N.Y. 1920))).
59. See id. (noting that the preference for severance is "particularly strong" when
there is a severability clause (quoting Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d
145, 148 (2d Cir. 1991))).
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provisions to be severed are so intertwined with the remaining provisions
that the result would be something the legislature never intended, then the
entire statute must be invalidated, even when the legislature provided a
severability clause.60
While there is much case law on severability (with and without
61severability clauses), there is little case law on inseverability clauses.
Zobel v. Williams is the only case where the U.S. Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of an inseverability clause.62 In Zobel, the Court
remanded the case to the Alaska Supreme Court to determine the effect of
the inseverability clause.63 Surveys of case law indicate that most courts
treat inseverability clauses as presumptions, identically to how they treat
severability clauses. 4 However, some commentators have suggested that
inseverability clauses are fundamentally different from severability clauses,
and should be analyzed in light of the legislative intent underlying their
inclusion.
D. Scenarios That New York Courts May Face Under the Marriage
Equality Act
1. New Jersey Civil Unions: Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association
In early 2007, a New Jersey same-sex couple tried to rent the Boardwalk
Pavilion owned by the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association (OGCMA)
for use in a civil union ceremony.66 OGCMA is a Methodist organization,
and they denied the request on the basis that civil unions, like same-sex
60. See Nat ' Adver. Co., 942 F.2d at 148 (noting that a severability clause is not an
invitation for the judiciary to rewrite law).
61. See Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REv.
997, 1006 (2005) (noting "few reported cases" and only two that have reached the
Supreme Court).
62. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982) (holding that a court can
sever an invalid provision unless it is evident the legislature would not have enacted the
legislation without the provision, and noting the inclusion of an inseverability clause in
the statute in question).
63. See id. (finding that the impact of the inseverability clause is a question of state
law); cf Kameny, supra note 61, at 1007 n.50 (noting that there is no subsequent
history after remand).
64. See Israel E. Friedman, Comment, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 903, 907-09 (1997) (surveying federal and state cases that treat the two
types identically).
65. Compare Kameny, supra note 61, at 997-1001 (arguing that coercive
inseverability clauses should not be followed), with Friedman, supra note 64, at 917-23
(arguing that inseverability clauses should be taken as "clear statement rules").
66. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious
Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 274, 279 (2010) (reviewing the case as an example
of balancing the rights of same-sex families with the religious freedoms of objectors).
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marriages, were inconsistent with church teachings. 67 The couple filed a
complaint with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (NJDCR), alleging
violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, which bars
discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of sexual
orientation or civil union status.68 NJDCR found probable cause to credit
the allegations.69
After the complaint was filed, OGCMA removed the Boardwalk
Pavilion from public use, and a state agency subsequently revoked a
specially-granted property tax exemption because the pavilion was no
longer open to all comers on an equal basis.7 0 When another same-sex
couple filed a similar discrimination complaint against OGCMA, unlike in
Bernstein, NJDCR found no probable cause, because the pavilion was no
longer a public accommodation available for such services.n While this
case applied New Jersey law, it provides a useful framework to analyze
how the New York DHR and courts would apply New York law to a
similar fact pattern.
2. Public Officials Refusing to Meet Obligations Based on Sincerely-Held
Religious Beliefs.
Immediately after the Marriage Equality Act passed, some New York
town clerks stated that they would not issue licenses to same-sex couples,
or resigned, citing religious objections.7 2 In response, the Nassau County
District Attorney issued a warning to clerks in her jurisdiction that they
could be subject to criminal prosecution for official misconduct.73 Under
67. See id. (discussing the religious rationale for the refusal).
68. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008, at 1
(Div. of Civil Rights, Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf (presenting the statutory basis
for the complaint).
69. See id. at 12 (finding that probable cause of discrimination by a place of public
accommodation had been established).
70. See id. at 5-6 (discussing the original grant of the exemption based on promise
of public access, OGCMA's decision to remove public access to avoid future conflicts,
and the subsequent revocation of the tax exemption).
71. See Moore v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03012, at 3-4
(Div. of Civil Rights, Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Moore-v-OGCMA-NPC.pdf (declining to find probable
cause for discrimination).
72. See, e.g., Paul Riede, Another New York Employee Resigns over New Gay
Marriage Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2011, 10:47 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/22/conservative-christian-em n_906262.html
(noting the resignation of one town clerk and the earlier refusal of another).
73. See Letter from Kathleen M. Rice, Dist. Att'y, Nassau Cnty., to Nassau Cnty.
Town & City Clerks (July 8, 2011), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/
84041181/Rice-Letter-Re-Marriage-Licenses (arguing that the religious exemptions in
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the Penal Law, a public official can be charged with misconduct for
depriving another of a legal benefit by failing to perform a duty imposed by
law, and the New York Court of Appeals has held that a "benefit" is not
limited to financial gain.74 The Nassau County District Attorney's analysis
has been disputed by opponents of same-sex marriage, based on the
religious accommodation provisions in the Human Rights Law.
After the Marriage Equality Act went into effect, the Ledyard, New
York, town clerk, citing religious objections to same-sex marriage, decided
to stop issuing all marriage licenses rather than be required to participate in
76a same-sex marriage. On August 30, 2011, the Ledyard clerk refused to
issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple, instead telling them to make
an appointment with the town's deputy clerk.n In response, the couple's
counsel sent a demand letter to the Ledyard town board, and a lawsuit may
be forthcoming.78 The outcome of the case may turn on whether or not
Ledyard actually had a deputy clerk at the time the clerk denied the same-
sex couple's request.7 9
III. ANALYSIS
A. The New Religious Exemptions Will Have Limited Impact.
New York rules of statutory interpretation require that courts interpret
74. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 2010) (defining misconduct as
including intentional deprivation of a benefit to another person by refusing to perform a
legally-mandated duty); People v. Feerick, 714 N.E.2d 851, 856 (N.Y. 1999)
(distinguishing New York's definition of "benefit" as "any gain or advantage" from
other states' more limited definitions (quoting PENAL § 10.00(17))).
75. See Memorandum from Alliance Def. Fund to N.Y. Mun. Clerks Responsible
for Issuing Marriage Licenses (July 15, 2011) [hereinafter ADF Memo], available at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/NYClerksSSMlicenseMemo.pdf (providing guidance on
requesting religious accommodations under the Human Rights Law).
76. See Tyler Kingkade, New York Town Clerk Refuses to Let Same-Sex Couple
Get Married, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/new-york-town-refuses-to-marry-gay-
couple n 964595.html (discussing Ledyard clerk's decision to stop issumg all
marriageTicenses).
77. See id (describing denial of license to same-sex couple); see also N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 30(10) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (allowing appointment of deputies in
incorporated towns).
78. See Press Release, People for the Am. Way, PFAW Foundation Demands That
N.Y. Town Clerks End Marriage Discrimination (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.pfaw.org/press-releases/2011/09/pfaw-foundation-demands-that-ny-town-
clerks-end-marriage-discrimination (demanding that the clerk be ordered to either
perform her duties or resign).
79. Compare Kingkade, supra note 76 (claiming that Ledyard had no deputy at the
time), with Michael Hill, Public Duty Clashes with Beliefs, ALBANY TIMES UNION (Oct.
25, 2011, 11:30 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Public-duty-clashes-
with-beliefs-2236460.php (explaining that the deputy was available).
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statutory language to ensure that statutes have some legal effect.80
However, the religious exemptions in the Marriage Equality Act largely
reiterate existing New York statutory and constitutional principles.si The
exemptions include only one new provision and its impact is limited.82
1. The Language Adds No New Interpretive Basis for Clerical Exemptions.
The Marriage Equality Act expressly exempts clergy from requirements
to solemnize marriages that violate their religious tenets, and bars private
claims or government sanction for such refusal. However, as noted in
Faur v. Jewish Theological Seminary of America, courts avoid interpreting
religious doctrine on constitutional grounds.84 Were a discrimination
complaint filed for refusal to solemnize a marriage, the court would follow
the Faur precedent of applying constitutional principles and dismiss the
complaint, because otherwise the court would be required to delve into
religious tenets.s Similarly, any state sanction for such refusal would be
struck down as infringing on the free exercise of religion under
Employment Division v. Smith.86 To find that the newly-enacted clerical
provisions do have some effect, a court should interpret the language added
by the Marriage Equality Act as a statement of legislative intent that courts
affirm the longstanding principle of avoiding questions that involve
religious interpretation.87
80. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 144 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that
statutory interpretation not render statutes ineffective).
81. See Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, §§ 10-b(2), 10-b(3), 2011 N.Y. Sess.
Laws 96 (McKinney) (providing that nothing in the Marriage Equality Act diminishes
the exemptions in the Human Rights Law or affects constitutional religious freedoms).
82. See id., sec. 1, § 10-b(1) (allowing religiously-affiliated organizations to refuse
to participate in celebrating or solemnizing marriages).
83. See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, sec. 5, § 11, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95
(McKinney) (clarifying that clergy may refuse to solemnize marriages and barring civil
claims for refusal); Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 2, § 11 (barring state sanction for refusal
to solemnize a marriage).
84. See Faur v. Jewish Theological Seminary of Am., 536 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (App.
Div. 1989) (noting that courts cannot make religious determinations without violating
constitutional religious freedom principles).
85. See id. (affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss discrimination
complaint in order to avoid constitutional issues); cf Madireddy v. Madireddy, 886
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (App. Div. 2009) (refusing, on constitutional grounds, to address
the validity of a Hindu marriage ceremony).
86. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that government is
barred from punishing expressions of religious doctrine or imposing disabilities on the
basis of religion).
87. Cf In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting adoption law to
avoid constitutional questions of the rights of adoptive parents and children); Vione v.
Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (avoiding religious questions by
analyzing tort and contract claims against plaintiffs pastor on neutral principles).
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2. The Introduction of Same-Sex Marriage Changes Nothing for Non-
Religiously-Affiliated Public Accommodations.
The Marriage Equality Act provides no new exemptions to allow a non-
religiously-affiliated place of public accommodation to defend a
discrimination complaint arising from refusal to provide services for a
same-sex marriage." The Human Rights Law already barred
discrimination in places of public accommodation based on marital status
and sexual orientation.89  When the legislature acts in an area of law, a
court should assume that the legislature covered what it intended and not
create an expanded interpretation in the absence of statutory language.90
Furthermore, the statement of legislative intent in the Marriage Equality
Act reinforces that rule of statutory interpretation.91 Therefore, the DHR or
a reviewing court must address a claim of discrimination from denial of
service for same-sex marriage like any other discrimination claim, as the
absence of exemptions is a legislative statement that no exemptions are
intended.92
3. Municipalities Are Barred from Diluting New and Existing Protections
for Religiously-Affiliated Organizations.
Domestic Relations Law section 10-b(2), added with the Marriage
Equality Act, reinforces the religious organization exemptions in Human
Rights Law section 296(11) by expressly overriding any other state or
municipal provision that might contradict or limit the protections.93 This
language was likely included preemptively, based on concern that
municipalities that provide stronger antidiscrimination protections than
state law might attempt to reduce the Human Rights Law's protections for
88. See generally Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95
(McKinney) (providing only religiously-based exemptions); Act of June 24, 2011, ch.
96, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 96 (McKinney) (providing only religiously-based
exemptions).
89. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (barring discrimination
by places of public accommodation on the basis of, inter alia, marital status and sexual
orientation).
90. See, e.g., Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 832-33 (Sup. Ct. 2008)
(finding that reading an exclusion of same-sex marriage into the Domestic Relations
Law, which is silent on the subject, would be judicial lawmaking, given the existence
of statutory bars to polygamy and closely-incestuous marriage).
91. See Marriage Equality Act § 2 (providing that omission of changes to other law
is not to be construed as intent to preserve any distinctions between marriages).
92. Cf id., sec. 3, § 10-a (providing, inter alia, that governmental protections
relating to marriage apply regardless of the sex of the parties).
93. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. I, § 10-b(2) (clarifying that the Marriage
Equality Act does not limit the protections in the Human Rights Law, regardless of any
other state or local provisions of law to the contrary).
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religious organizations.9 4 A court facing a challenge to a local ordinance's
scope would look for a way to resolve the conflict without reaching the
constitutional issue of balancing one party's religious freedom against the
other party's right to be free from discrimination.95 The express language
in the Marriage Equality Act noting that no other provisions of law can
diminish the protections provided by the Human Rights Law will allow a
court to avoid the constitutional question.96 Thus, a court will likely
invalidate any local restrictions as preempted by state law, based on the
state legislature's clear expression of intent to occupy that area of law.97
4. Religiously-Affiliated Organizations Are Now Protected from Claims of
Discrimination for Refusal to Participate in Celebration of a Same-Sex
Marriage.
Because the religious exemptions in the Human Rights Law apply only
to claims brought under the Human Rights Law itself, a religiously-
affiliated organization could still face a discrimination claim under the
Civil Rights Law.9 8 Domestic Relations Law section 10-b(l), added with
the Marriage Equality Act, provides a broad exemption applicable to any
provision of state or local law, exempting religiously-affiliated
organizations from in any way supporting the celebration or solemnization
of marriage.99 Therefore, a complaint filed under the Civil Rights Law,
which would have been viable prior to enactment of the Marriage Equality
Act, is now expressly preempted by the new exemption that applies to all
facets of state law. 00
94. Compare N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102, 8-107 (2010) (covering gender
identity by defining "gender" to include both sex and gender identity and prohibiting
discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation), with N.Y. ExEC. LAW §§ 292,
296 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (defining only "sexual orientation" and prohibiting
discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation).
95. Cf In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (avoiding constitutional
questions of the rights of parents and children in interpreting adoption law).
96. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 10-b(2) (barring any provision of state or
local law that limits the religious exemptions in the Human Rights Law).
97. See Hoetzer v. Erie Cnty., 497 F. Supp. 1207, 1216 (W.D.N.Y. 1980)
(explaining that a local law is preempted when the state legislature demonstrates intent
to cover a complete statutory area via state law).
98. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney 2009) (defining sexual orientation
discrimination in places of public accommodation as a violation subject to civil and/or
criminal sanction); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 808 N.Y.S.2d
447, 465-66 (App. Div.) (noting that the Human Rights Law gives no indication that its
exemptions apply to any other laws), aff'd, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
99. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 1 0-b(1) (exempting religiously-affiliated
organizations from facilitating celebration or solemnization of marnage and barring
private or public sanction for such refusal).
100. See id. (expressly preempting any other provision of state or local law that
might conflict with the exemption).
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Section 10-b(1) also covers any non-profit corporation controlled by a
religious organization, while the Human Rights Law exemptions depend on
the purpose of the organization.'0 ' In this respect, section 10-b(1) appears
to have been written to defeat a finding of discrimination in a scenario
similar to that which arose in the New Jersey case of Bernstein v. Ocean
Grove Camp Meeting Association.1 o2 However, unlike the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, the New York Human Rights Law deems certain
religious corporations "distinctly private," which strips the DHR of
jurisdiction to hear a public accommodation complaint.'03 Therefore, the
new exemption is only necessary for, and would only apply to, the case of a
non-profit corporation that is not incorporated under the Religious
Corporations Law or Benevolent Orders Law but is controlled by such a
corporation. o4
a. Without the Exemption Provided by Section 10-b(1), the New
York DHR Would Reach the Same Conclusion That Its New
Jersey Counterpart Did for OGCMA4.
In Bernstein, the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights found that the
Pavilion was a place of public accommodation. 0 5  While "boardwalk
pavilion" is not enumerated in the New York Human Rights Law's
definition of public accommodations, the definition is broad and controlled
by what is excluded, not what is included.'06 The DHR would then look to
101. Compare id. (covering "not-for-profit corporation[s] operated, supervised, or
controlled by a religious corporation"), with N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney
Supp. 2011) (covering "organization[s] operated for charitable or educational
purposes ... operated, supervised or controlled by ... a religious organization").
102. See generally Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-
03008 (Div. of Civil Rights, Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf (finding probable cause to
support the discrimination claim brought by a same-sex couple who attempted to rent a
facility for a civil union ceremony).
103. Compare id. at 7 (noting that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination has
no blanket exemption for facilities operated by religious groups), with N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 292(9) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (deeming religious corporations and benevolent
orders as "distinctly private"). See also Gifford v. Guilderland Lodge, No. 2480,
B.P.O.E., 707 N.Y.S.2d 722, 722-23 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming dismissal of a
discrimination complaint based on the plain language of the benevolent order
exception, irrespective of limitations that apply to other private groups).
104. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 10-b(1) (exempting "a not-for-profit
corporation operated, supervised, or controlled by" a religious organization).
105. See Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 7-9 (analyzing New Jersey's definition
of public accommodation and OGCMA's use of the Pavilion to conclude that it was a
public accommodation).
106. See EXEC. § 292(9) (including, inter alia, roof gardens, recreation parks, resort
camps, and fairs, in "place of public accommodation, resort or amusement"); cf Cahill
v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that the Human Rights Law requires
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the facility's usage, finding that it was previously rented to all comers
based simply on availability, application, and payment of a rental fee,
including for religious weddings of different faiths, and that a state
property tax exemption had been granted based on the owner's promise to
keep the facility open to all.10 7 The DHR would conclude that the facility
was a place of public accommodation, because the owner had failed to
meet its burden of proving that the facility is "distinctly private."1a8
Therefore, denial of access for same-sex marriages, while allowing access
for opposite-sex marriages, would be discrimination based on sexual
orientation.'0 9
The hypothetical owner would likely argue that the denial was based on
religious doctrine, not sexual orientation, and hence protected under section
296(11); but, having routinely rented for marriages of other faiths, that
argument would likely fail because the law does not protect blanket
discrimination."o Similarly, arguments that the bar on discrimination
based on sexual orientation infringes constitutional religious freedoms
would also fail because, as was the case for the statute at issue in Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, the Human Rights Law is a
neutral law of general applicability, which does not require that the court
apply heightened scrutiny."' Therefore, under the Human Rights Law,
without the new exemption included in section 10-b(1), the New York
DHR would likely find probable cause to support the claim of
discrimination based on sexual orientation." 2
107. Accord Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 7-9 (reviewing the factors the
NJDCR examined in its determination that the Pavilion was a place of public
accommodation).
108. Accord Cahill, 674 N.E.2d at 277 (clarifying that a dental office had the burden
to show that it was "distinctly private").
109. Cf Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 9 (noting that denial of access for civil
union ceremonies while allowing them for marriages was discrimination based on civil
union status).
110. Cf Logan v. Salvation Army, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(holding that while the exemptions allow religious organizations to choose to
discriminate in hiring, they do not protect it from claims of religious harassment after
hiring).
111. See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 808 N.Y.S.2d 447,
455 (App. Div.) (holding that a law requiring all employer-provided health insurance
programs to cover contraception was a neutral law of general applicability that did not
unconstitutionally infringe religious freedom), aff'd, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006);
accord Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12 (finding that New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination is neutral and generally applicable).
112. Cf Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12 (finding probable cause of
discrimination under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination).
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b. The Exemption Added by Section 1 0-b(1) Will Prevent DHR from
Finding Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, but Would
Not Prevent Loss of a Tax Exemption.
Because the hypothetical owner is a religiously-affiliated organization
and the rental is for celebration of marriage, section 10-b(1) clearly bars a
claim of discrimination for denial of the rental. 13 Conversely, loss of the
property tax exemption would likely not be barred by section 10-b(1)." 4 In
Bernstein, the property tax exemption was granted years earlier after
OGCMA promised that the facility would be open to all comers, and the
loss of the tax exemption was based on the decision to stop renting out the
facility, not due to the refusal to rent the Pavilion for a civil union
deremony.n 5 In New York, were the hypothetical owner to keep the
facility open, except for weddings, section 10-b(1) would likely bar
retraction of the tax exemption."' 6 In Bernstein, removal of public access
was in response to the discrimination complaint, and to avoid future similar
complaints.'7 Under section 10-b(1) in New York, there would be no
reason to withdraw public use of the facility because the law bars the
discrimination complaint, which would appear to moot the tax exemption
question.' Were the owner to close the facility to the public, the tax
exemption could be revoked based on termination of the equal-access
condition, but if the tax exemption were revoked following refusal to rent
the facility for marriage, a New York court would likely strike down that
action as a clear violation of section 10-b(1)." 9
B. New York Rules of Statutory Interpretation Imply That the Inseverability
Clause Should Be Given Effect.
None of the provisions in the Marriage Equality Act point to new
113. See Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, § 10-b(1), 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 96
(McKinney) (exempting religiously-affiliated organizations from providing
accommodations for marriage ceremonies and barring private claims and government
sanctions for such refusal).
114. Cf id. (limiting exemptions to solemnization and celebration of marriages).
115. See Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 4-6 (reviewing grant and then removal
of the pavilion's property tax exemption by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection).
116. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 10-b(1) (barring penalty for marriage-related
denials of service).
117. See Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 5 (discussing termination of rentals of
the pavilion).
118. See id. at 4-6 (finding that removal of the tax exemption followed causally from
the initial discrimination complaint).
119. See Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 10-b(l) (barring government penalty or loss
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constitutional interpretations, and courts place a high priority on avoiding
questions of constitutionality. 12 0  However, the amendment that
strengthened the religious exemptions also included an inseverability
clause, which warrants exploration of what might happen should a court
find a reason to hold the exemptions unconstitutional. 12 1 While there is
little case law on inseverability, case law on severability supports the
conclusion that a court interpreting New York law would find the Marriage
Equality Act's inseverability clause enforceable.122
Under New York law, unconstitutional statutory provisions are severed
only if the remaining provisions can still function and the legislature clearly
would have enacted the remaining statutory language.12 3 The inseverability
clause is a clear statement that the legislature would not have enacted the
Marriage Equality Act in the absence of the religious exemptions.124
Because the primary requirement of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to the intent of the legislature, the only avenue by which a court could
reject enforcing the inseverability clause would be to find that doing so
would create hardship or injustice for same-sex couples. 125
In response to an argument that invalidating the entire Marriage Equality
Act would result in injustice for married same-sex couples, a court would
likely reference the history of common law marriage in New York. 12 6
While New York eliminated common law marriage by statute in 1933,
marriages entered into prior to that date remained valid. 27  With this
analogous precedent, a court that invalidated the Marriage Equality Act
120. See, e.g., LaValle v. Hayden, 773 N.E.2d 490, 494 (N.Y. 2002) (arguing that
courts must try to avoid interpreting a presumptively valid statute to find it
unconstitutional).
121. See Act of June 24, 2011 § 3 (invalidating the entire Marriage Equality Act if
any section is found invalid).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 603 F. Supp. 2d 715,
734 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (reviewing the criteria by which New York courts will sever
provisions of a statute, with or without a severability clause), aff'd, 612 F.3d 97 (2d
Cir. 2010).
123. See Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1991)
(applying New York law to invalidate an entire statute because the remaining
provisions could not function alone, even though the statute contained a severability
clause).
124. See Act of June 24, 2011 § 3 (requiring that the Act be construed as a whole).
125. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 146 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that
statutes not be construed to create hardship or injustice); cf Braschi v. Stahl Assocs.,
543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to read "family member" in a rent-control
statute in a way that would result in injustice for the lessee's eleven-year live-in same-
sex partner).
126. See generally In re Benjamin's Estate, 311 N.E.2d 495, 496-97 (N.Y. 1974)
(finding that absence of documentary evidence was insufficient to conclude there was
not a common law marriage).
127. See id. at 496 (noting that common law marriages remained valid if the parties
were otherwise competent to have been married at the time the law went into effect).
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would likely hold that existing same-sex marriages remain valid. 2 8  in
addition, an argument that barring same-sex marriage was itself an injustice
would also likely fail based on prior decisions finding no constitutional
right to same-sex marriage.12 9
C. The Lack ofPublic Employee Exemptions Creates Minimal Burdens.
While the Marriage Equality Act provides exemptions for religiously
affiliated organizations, it provides no exemptions for public employees
and officials involved in the process of civil marriage. 130 Proponents of
such additional exemptions argue that public employees face special
burdens when required to facilitate marriages that violate their religious
beliefs.' 3  However, existing provisions of New York law requiring
accommodations ensure that the burden on public employees and officials
will be minimal, if any at all, obviating the need for such exemptions.132
1. Town and City Clerks Could Be Charged with Official Misconduct.
Upon presentation of a marriage license application, town and city
clerks, such as the Ledyard town clerk, are required to issue the license
after ensuring that the parties are eligible to be married under the Domestic
Relations Law.133  The clerk of New York City is also required to
solemnize marriages for couples whose license was issued by the New
York City clerk's office; no other town or city clerks have that
responsibility.134 The Domestic Relations Law's use of the term "shall"
renders these responsibilities presumptively mandatory, not
128. Cf Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.2d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009) (affirming California's
constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage but maintaining same-sex
marriages performed prior to the amendment because the amendment was not
retroactive).
129. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (finding no
constitutional violation in restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples under the
Domestic Relations Law).
130. Cf Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, § 10-b, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 96
(McKinney) (providing exemptions for religiously-affiliated organizations only).
131. See Wilson, supra note 9, at 324-39 (explaining that the lack of exemptions
forces religious objectors to violate their beliefs or leave their jobs, with concomitant
loss of benefits, and arguing that providing exemptions creates minimal burdens).
132. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(10)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (requiring
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employee religious practices);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(l)(a) (McKinney 2010) (providing that deputies can issue
marriage licenses).
133. See DOM. REL. § 15(2) (specifying that the clerk "shall" issue the license if the
provided information is sufficient); id. § 15(l)(a) (specifying the information to be
obtained from the bride and groom, such as age, residence, and status of any prior
marriage).
134. See id. § 11 -a(1)(b) (establishing a duty for the city clerk or one of his deputies
to solemnize the marriage upon request).
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discretionary. 135  Since no statutory provision appears to defeat this
presumption, courts will likely continue to find that the language creates a
mandatory duty.136
As the Nassau County District Attorney warned, a clerk who refuses to
issue a license may be charged with official misconduct, as might the New
York City clerk for refusing to solemnize a marriage. 137 Failing to issue a
marriage license would deprive the couple of the benefit of the license, and
refusing to solemnize a marriage would deprive the couple of the benefit of
being married.138 Because the clerk is a public servant, the express refusal
demonstrates knowledge of the duty, and the couple was deprived of a
benefit, most of the elements of the prima facie case for official misconduct
are easily satisfied.139 Whether a clerk is found culpable, however, will
turn on whether the clerk actually intended to deprive the couple of the
benefit of the marriage license or of the solemnization.14 0  A defense
argument that the clerk intended to have someone else provide the service,
and did not intend that the couple be denied a license or solemnization,
might suffice to defeat the mens rea for official misconduct.141
2. Individual Clerks Can Avoid Facing an Official Misconduct Charge via
Existing Provisions ofLaw.
The Ledyard town clerk deferred responsibility for issuing marriage
licenses to a deputy, and in so doing, likely will avoid a charge of official
135. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 177 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 2011) (directing that
command words like "must" and "shall" in statutes are presumptively mandatory, while
discretionary words like "may" are presumptively permissive).
136. See Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861-62 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (noting
that clerks lack discretion in issuing licenses), aff'd, 811 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div.),
aff'dsum nom. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
137. See Rice, supra note 73 (threatening to charge any clerk in her county who
refuses to issue a license to a same-sex couple with official misconduct); see also N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 2010) (defining the crime of official misconduct as
including both performance of unauthorized acts and refusal to perform duties imposed
by law).
138. See PENAL § 10.00(17) (including advantage to beneficiary, or third person as
desired by the beneficiary, in the definition of "benefit"); cf DOM. REL. § 13 (requiring
couples to obtain a license from a town or city clerk in order to get married).
139. See PENAL § 195.00 (defining one form of official misconduct as a public
servant depriving a person of a benefit by knowingly refraining from performing a duty
imposed by law).
140. See id. (requiring that the deprivation of a benefit be intentional); id. § 15.05(1)
(defining intent as conscious objective to cause the result).
141. Cf Hill, supra note 79 (explaining that the Ledyard town clerk is referring
license applications to a deputy to avoid religious conflict). But cf People v. Feerick,
714 N.E.2d 851, 858 (N.Y. 1999) (finding intent to commit official misconduct by
obtaining a benefit when officers illegally entered premises to retrieve a lost radio,
benefiting the officers by avoiding ridicule and/or discipline for the loss).
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misconduct. 14 2 The Human Rights Law requires that employers reasonably
accommodate employees' religious practices when practical. 143 Because
this requirement applies to public as well as private employers, the burden
will be on the town or city management to show that accommodating a
request from the clerk would cause undue hardship to the town or city.' 44
As provided by the Domestic Relations Law, accommodations can be made
by having a deputy clerk issue marriage licenses, and in the case of the
New York City clerk, having a deputy solemnize marriages. 145 For towns
and cities that do not currently have a deputy, the clerk can appoint one or
have the municipal leadership do so.14 6
The Human Rights Law allows denial of the request if the
accommodation presents a significant economic burden, if it will
significantly interfere with operations, or if it will cause the employee to be
unable to perform the essential function of employment.14 7 Because most
cities and larger towns are likely to have existing deputies, and town clerks
are allowed to appoint unpaid deputies, an economic burden would only
arise if the cost to hire a deputy was burdensome to a small town and the
clerk was unable to find a volunteer. 14 8 Provision of a deputy would not
cause the clerk to be unable to complete the essential functions of the office
and would only minimally interfere with office operations; as such, the
accommodation would not be an undue hardship on those bases. 149
142. See Kingkade, supra note 76 (noting that marriage license applications have
been deferred to the deputy clerk).
143. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(10)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (requiring
reasonable accommodations for employee religious practices, unless such
accommodations would cause undue hardship to the employer).
144. See id. § 296(10)(d) (placing burden of proof on employer); accord N.Y.C.
Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 674 N.E.2d 305, 310 (N.Y. 1996) (noting
that the city did not attempt to show a burden from accommodating the request for
alternative time off for religious observances).
145. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2010) (specifying that the duty of
the town or city clerk to issue marriage licenses may be performed by the clerk or one
of his or her deputies); id. § 11 -a(1)(b) (providing that the New York City clerk's
deputies can solemnize marriages in the clerk's stead).
146. See ADF Memo, supra note 75, at 3-4 (noting that the clerk must make the
request ahead of time).
147. See EXEC. § 296(10)(d)(1) (defining "undue hardship" as one that causes
significant expense or difficulty, and enumerating factors to be considered in the
determination).
148. See N.Y. TowN LAW § 30(10)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (specifying that
deputy town clerks are uncompensated, unless otherwise approved by the town board);
cf Robert Harding, Residents Blast Gay Marriage Stance at Ledyard Town Board
Meeting, AUBURNPUB.COM (Sept. 13, 2011, 3:05 AM), http://auburnpub.com/news/
local/article 521150c6-ddc5-lleO-8849-001cc4cO3286.html (noting that the most
Ledyard has paid for deputy clerks was $200 in 2010).
149. See TowN § 30 (defining the duties of town clerks, encompassing many
functions beyond issuing marriage licenses); cf Harding, supra note 148 (noting
concern from Ledyard citizens that anyone seeking a marriage license would now be
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Therefore, in almost all situations, a clerk's request for the accommodation
of having a deputy facilitate marriage-related duties should be granted. "0
The clerk can then delegate marriage-related tasks to the deputy, as the
Ledyard town clerk has done.151 A town or city clerk who has requested a
deputy, but where that request has not been granted, could still potentially
be charged with official misconduct for failing to issue marriage licenses or
solemnize marriages. 152 However, should such charges be brought, the
clerk's request for an accommodation will likely rebut the mens rea of
intent to deprive of a benefit. 153
3. Almost No Conflict Can Arise over Solemnization ofMarriage.
Clergy, certain state and local officials, and some members of the federal
judiciary are empowered, but not required, to solemnize marriages.' 54
Other than the New York City clerk, the discretionary nature of marriage
solemnization should provide no basis for a charge of official
misconduct."5  Only if a court were to construe solemnization of marriage
as a duty that is "clearly inherent in the nature of' the officiant's office
could such a charge be made, but this interpretation is rarely applied.'56 In
the case of "marriage officers," a court might consider the duty to
solemnize inherent in the nature of the office, but, while the statute
empowers "marriage officers" to solemnize marriages, it does not impose a
duty. 157 Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would sustain a charge of
official misconduct for refusal to solemnize a marriage.
required to make an appointment to see the deputy clerk).
150. See ExEc. § 296(10)(d) (requiring the employer to prove "undue hardship").
151. See, e.g., TOWN § 30(10)(a) (empowering the clerk to define the duties of the
deputy clerk).
152. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 2010) (defining official misconduct
as failure to perform a duty imposed by law).
153. See id. (requiring intention to deny the benefit).
154. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2010) (specifying eligible officiants
without placing a requirement on any); id § 11-c (allowing municipalities to appoint
"marriage officers" with the authority, but not obligation, to solemnize marriages). But
see id. 11-a (requiring the New York City clerk to solemnize marriages for licenses
issued by that office).
155. See id. §§ 11, 11-c (allowing, but not requiring, municipal and judicial officials
to solemnize marriages).
156. See PENAL § 195.00(2) (including failure to perform either express or inherent
duties in the definition of official misconduct); People v. Mackell, 366 N.Y.S.2d 173,
181-82 (App. Div. 1975) (noting, in dicta, possible application to discretionary duties,
but dismissing charges for failure to prosecute), aff'd, 351 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1976).
157. Compare DOM. REL. § 11-c(1) (granting marriage officers "the authority to
solemnize" marriages), with id § 11-a(l)(b) (stating that "it shall be the duty of' the
New York City clerk to solemnize the marriage).
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4. Clerks and Officiants Must Still Perform Their Duties in a Non-
discriminatory Fashion.
Another important factor is that the Ledyard town clerk delegated all
license applications to the deputy clerk.'5 8  A town or city clerk who
delegates duties to a deputy as a religious accommodation must do so for
all couples, not just same-sex couples, as the Marriage Equality Act
requires that there be no distinctions between same-sex and opposite-sex
marriage, and discrimination based on sexual orientation is a civil rights
violation.159 Similarly, a public official who refused to solemnize a
marriage because of the sexual orientation of the parties could also
potentially face charges under the Civil Rights Law, but proof of
intentional discrimination sufficient to overcome the discretionary nature of
the act would be difficult to ascertain.16 0 Therefore, existing New York law
protects public employees who avail themselves of the religious
accommodation provisions and continue to perform their duties in a non-
discriminatory fashion, without needing new exemptions.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The addition of religious exemptions to the Marriage Equality Act
caused much turmoil but was a necessary political bargain to secure
passage of the Act.' 6 ' Even though New York declined to enact the full set
of exemptions proposed by a group of legal scholars, the language enacted
still sweeps broadly.16 2 Legislators in other states considering marriage
equality statutes should be wary of the scope of these proposed exemptions,
and follow a model of protections and exemptions represented by New
York's Human Rights Law.
158. See Kingkade, supra note 76 (noting that the deputy clerk is handling all
marriage license applications).
159. See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 2, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney)
(specifying legislative intent that same-sex and opposite-sex marriages be treated
equally under the law); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-c(2), 40-d (McKinney 2009)
(criminalizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
160. Cf Butler v. City of Batavia, 545 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)
(dismissing a federal civil rights complaint against police, holding that plaintiffs had
shown disparate treatment based on sexual orientation, but had failed to sufficiently
allege intent to discriminate), aff'd, 323 F. App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2009).
161. See, e.g., Kenneth Lovett, Gay Marriage Bill Dead Without Church
Exemptions, Says State Sen. Greg Ball, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 6, 2011),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-06/local/29645229_1_marriage-bill-gay-
marriage-gay-couples (opining that without stronger religious exemptions the bill could
not garner sufficient votes to pass the Republican-led State Senate).
162. See generally Skelos Letter, supra note 10, at 3-4 (proposing exemptions for
individuals, non-religiously-affiliated small businesses, and public employees); Act of
June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, § 10-b(1), 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 96 (McKinney)
(providing exemptions for all marriages, not just same-sex marriages).
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A. Proposed Religious Exemption Language Threatens Much
Antidiscrimination Law.
The scholarly proposal would exempt religiously affiliated groups from
not only providing any services to support solemnization and celebration of
marriage, but also from "treat[ing] as valid any marriage."l163 It would
allow individuals, small businesses, and public employees to discriminate
in a range of areas where antidiscrimination law generally applies.'64
While the proposal provides a "hardship exception," the scope is still
breathtaking.165
The proposal's proponents appear to dismiss concerns that it applies to
all marriages, not just to same-sex marriages. But not even fifty years
ago, a Virginia court used a sincerely held religious belief to affirm the
anti-miscegenation statute that the Supreme Court later struck down in
Loving v. Virginia.'6 7  As recently as 2009, a Justice of the Peace in
Louisiana refused to marry an interracial couple, constitutionally suspect
behavior that would appear to be sanctioned by these proposed
exemptions.168 The proposed exemption language is also quite vague; it
does not define what it means to "assist" or "promote" marriage, and it
does not clarify what it means to be exempt from treating a marriage as
valid.'69
The proponents of these exemptions also suggest that those who deny
163. See Skelos Letter, supra note 10, at 3 (proposing statutory exemption for clergy
and religiously-affiliated organizations, applicable to all marriages, not just same-sex
marriages); see also infra Appendix II (presenting the complete proposed statutory
language).
164. See Skelos Letter, supra note 10, at 3 (providing exemptions from provision of
goods and services related to marriages, from provision of employee spousal benefits,
and from renting to any married couple).
165. See id at 3 (providing that the exemptions do not apply if the party to a
marriage is unable to obtain goods and services elsewhere without "substantial
hardship").
166. See Wilson, supra note 9, at 335, 340 (positing that including a same-sex
qualification would create a constitutionally questionable facial classification, but that
allowing exemptions for race discrimination, for example, is not likely to be a concern).
167. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (highlighting the state court's
statement that God put the races on separate continents because he did not intend them
to mix).
168. See, e.g., Elyse Siegel, Interracial Couple Denied Marriage License by
Louisiana Justice of the Peace, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/15/interracial-couple-denied n 322784.html
(noting that the refusal was based on concern for the children they might have).
169. Accord Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions
to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public
Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 236, 243-44 (2010) (questioning whether a
jeweler could refuse to sell rings to a same-sex couple, and whether rejecting the
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services to same-sex couples could inform the public of this by messages
on their websites or signs in their shops.' 70 This hearkens back to a time
when "Whites only" or "Irish need not apply" signs were common, which
was the very reason that antidiscrimination laws were originally enacted.17 1
While cloaked as exemptions to same-sex marriage, the proposed language
seems more like an attempt to fundamentally alter the balance between
antidiscrimination law and religious freedom.172 So far no legislature has
adopted these proposals, and none should.173
B. States Should Continue to Follow the Model ofBroad Antidiscrimination
Laws and Broad Religious Exemptions.
New York's broad antidiscrimination law and equally broad religious
exemptions provide little, if any, need for marriage-specific exemptions.174
The cases raised by marriage-equality opponents as evidence of the impact
of same-sex marriage on religious objectors primarily relate to protection
of sexual orientation under antidiscrimination law, not to marriage.17
Cases from states that do not even recognize same-sex marriages are raised
as reasons why marriage-specific exemptions are needed.'7 6 Even when
arguing specifically for exemptions for public employees involved in the
marriage process, the exemption proponents fail to explain why existing
employment accommodation laws are insufficient. 7 7
The argument for marriage-specific exemptions appears to come down to
a belief that same-sex marriages are somehow different from other
marriages.' 78 This argument can carry no weight under antidiscrimination
170. See id at 254-56 (discussing "sign-posting" proposals by proponents of these
exemptions).
171. Accord id at 255-57 (discussing these and other examples of such explicit or
implicit messaging enabling discrimination).
172. Accord id. at 258 (surmising that the real complaint of the proponents is not
with same-sex marriage, but rather with antidiscrimination law more broadly,
especially protections based on sexual orientation).
173. But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-5(a)(3) (LEXIS through Jan. 2011 Sess.)
(exempting religiously-affiliated organizations from recognizing a civil union as valid
in Rhode Island's newly-enacted civil union statute).
174. See supra Part III (analyzing the existing protections and obligations of New
York's antidiscrimination law in the context of the Marriage Equality Act).
175. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 66, at 280-81 (concluding that the
OGCMA case, posited as one of same-sex civil unions impacting religious freedom,
was actually about public accommodations and sexual orientation discrimination).
176. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 9, at 318 n.1 (highlighting a New Mexico decision
finding that a wedding photographer violated the state's antidiscrimination law for
refusing to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony).
177. Cf id. at 346-57 (analyzing cases under federal law to argue that marriage-
specific exemptions are constitutional, without discussing why existing laws are
insufficient).
178. Accord Flynn, supra note 169, at 251-54 (arguing that proponents' position is
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law that covers marital status and sexual orientation and following
statements of legislative intent that the law retains no distinctions between
opposite-sex and same-sex marriage.17 9
As more states consider legislative implementation of marriage equality,
a system of broad antidiscrimination protections, with broad exemptions
for religiously affiliated organizations and religious accommodations for
employment, should be used as a model. 80 The burden should be placed
on proponents to explain the necessity of additional exemptions specific to
same-sex marriage, as well as ensuring that any such exemptions are
narrowly tailored to that necessity.
V. CONCLUSION
New York antidiscrimination law has barred most forms of
discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation for
many years, while providing broad exemptions for religiously-affiliated
organizations and requiring employers to accommodate the religious
practices of their employees. The Marriage Equality Act provides
exemptions for clergy and religiously affiliated organizations, allowing
them to refuse to participate in celebration and solemnization of same-sex
marriages.182 Although courts are required to interpret statutory language
as having some legal effect, courts called upon to interpret the Act will find
it challenging to distinguish the new provisions from the existing statutory
and constitutional protections. 83
Perhaps more importantly, the New York legislature left out new
the misunderstanding of homosexual identity versus homosexual conduct); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief
and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REv. 657, 660-64 (2011)
(analogizing the status/conduct distinction used to oppose same-sex marriage to
arguments used to oppose desegregation and to support antimiscegenation law).
179. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (including marital status
and sexual orientation discrimination in all categories of unlawful discrimination);
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 2, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney) (specifying
legislative intent that same-sex and opposite-sex marriage be treated identically under
the law).
180. See EXEC. §§ 292(9), 296(2) (defining public accommodations broadly, but
deeming religious and benevolent corporations as "distinctly private"); id. § 296(10)
(requiring employers to accommodate religious practices of their employees); id
§296(11) (exempting religious organizations from many provisions of the Human
Rights Law).
181. See generally id § 296 (proscribing many forms of private discrimination while
providing religion-based exemptions).
182. See Marriage Equality Act, sec. 5, § 11 (exempting clergy from requirement to
solemnize marriages); Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, sec. 1, § 10-b, 2011 N.Y. Sess.
Laws 96 (McKinney) (providing exemptions from celebration and solemnization of
marriages for religiously-affiliated organizations).
183. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the new religious exemptions in light of
existing law and finding little impact).
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exemptions for public employees as well as broader exemptions for
religiously-affiliated and unaffiliated organizations. 184  Religious
accommodation requirements in New York law make public employee
exemptions unnecessary.185  Because proposed alternate exemption
language would significantly alter antidiscrimination law, the New York
legislature was correct in excluding the extensions, and other states are well
advised to follow New York's model when they consider marriage equality
legislation.186
184. Compare Act of June 24, 2011 sec. 2, § 10-b (exempting only religiously-
affiliated organizations), with Skelos Letter, supra note 10, at 3-4 (proposing
significantly broader exemptions).
185. See supra Part III.C (explaining existing statutory provisions that allow almost
all objecting public employees to be accommodated under existing law).
186. See supra Part IV (concluding that the effect of the exemption language
proposed to, but not adopted by, the New York legislature would be to radically roll
back protections from discrimination based on sexual orientation).
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APPENDIX I. SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK MARRIAGE
EQUALITY ACT
The following provisions of the New York Marriage Equality Act are
discussed in detail in the Background and Analysis:1 87
Statement of legislative intent:
It is the intent of the legislature that the marriages of same-sex and
different-sex couples be treated equally in all respects under the law.
The omission from this act of changes to other provisions of law shall
not be construed as a legislative intent to preserve any legal distinction
between same-sex couples and different-sex couples with respect to
marriage. The legislature intends that all provisions of law which utilize
gender-specific terms in reference to the parties to a marriage, or which
in any other way may be inconsistent with this act, be construed in a
gender-neutral manner or in any way necessary to effectuate the intent of
this act.188
Provisions of the religious exemptions, as adopted:
1. Notwithstanding any state, local or municipal law, rule, regulation,
ordinance, or other provision of law to the contrary, a religious entity as
defined under the education law or section two of the religious
corporations law, or a corporation incorporated under the benevolent
orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under
any other law of this state, or a not-for-profit corporation operated,
supervised, or controlled by a religious corporation, or any employee
thereof, being managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with
a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit corporation
as described in this subdivision, shall not be required to provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the
solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any such refusal to provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
shall not create any civil claim or cause of action or result in any state or
local government action to penalize, withhold benefits, or discriminate
against such religious corporation, benevolent order, a not-for-profit
corporation operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious
corporation, or any employee thereof being managed, directed, or
supervised by or in conjunction with a religious corporation, benevolent
order, or a not-for-profit corporation.
187. See supra Parts II-III (providing background on New York Marriage Law and
analyzing the new statutory language in context of existing antidiscrimination and
marriage law).
188. Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 2, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney).
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2. Notwithstanding any state, local or municipal law or rule, regulation,
ordinance, or other provision of law to the contrary, nothing in this
article shall limit or diminish the right, pursuant to subdivision eleven of
section two hundred ninety-six of the executive law, of any religious or
denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated
for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or
controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, to limit
employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission
to or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or
from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote
the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.
3. Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to limit the
protections and exemptions otherwise provided to religious organizations
under section three of article one of the constitution of the state of New
York. 189
The inseverability clause:
This act is to be construed as a whole, and all parts of it are to be read
and construed together. If any part of this act shall be adjudged by any
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the remainder of this act
shall be invalidated. Nothing herein shall be construed to affect the
parties' right to appeal the matter.190
189. Act of June 24, 2011, sec. 1, § 10-b.
190. Id. § 3.
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APPENDIX II. ACADEMIC PROPOSAL FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION
LANGUAGE
The following statutory language, discussed in detail in the Policy
Recommendations section, was proposed by a group of academic authors to
the President of the New York State Senate, but was not adopted as part of
the Marriage Equality Act.19 1 Versions of this statutory language have
been proposed in each state that has considered marriage equality
legislation; the New York version is only the most recent. 92
Section XX
(a) Religious organizations protected.
No religious or denominational organization, no organization operated
for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled
by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual
employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the
scope of that employment, shall be required to
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods,
or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or
celebration of any marriage; or
(2) solemnize any marriage; or
(3) treat as valid any marriage
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such
organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious
beliefs.
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole
proprietor, or small business shall be required to
(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the
solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide
counseling or other services that directly facilitate the
perpetuation of any marriage; or
(B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
(C) provide housing to any married couple
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause
191. See supra Part IV (analyzing the ramifications of adopting such broad religious
exemptions). See generally Skelos Letter, supra note 10 (proposing exemptions for
individuals, non-religiously-affiliated small businesses, and public employees).
192. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Berg et al., to Hon. Christopher G. Donovan,
Speaker, Connecticut House of Representatives (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.nationformarriage.org/atf/cf/%7B39D8B5CI -F9FE-48CO-ABE6-
1029BA77854C%7D/Berg.etal.pdf (proposing broad religious exemptions with
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such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small
businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if
(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good
or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere
without substantial hardship; or
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee
or official, if another government employee or official is not
promptly available and willing to provide the requested
government service without inconvenience or delay; provided
that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall
be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate
the judicial officer's sincerely held religious beliefs.
(3) A "small business" within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a
legal entity other than a natural person
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an
owner of the business; or
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or
(C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that
owns five or fewer units of housing.
(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges protected by this section shall
(1) result in a civil claim or cause of action challenging such
refusal; or
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to
penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or
individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions,
including but not limited to laws regarding employment
discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational
institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-
exempt status.193
193. Skelos Letter, supra note 10, at 3-4.
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